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Anxious and Angry: Emotional
Responses to the COVID-19 Threat
David Abadi*, Irene Arnaldo and Agneta Fischer
Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
The current coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic elicits a vast amount
of anxiety. In the current study, we investigated how anxiety related to COVID-19 is
associated with support for and compliance with governmental hygiene measures, and
how these are influenced by populist attitudes, anger at the government, and conspiracy
mentalities. We conducted an online survey in April 2020 in four different countries
(Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK; N = 2,031) using a cross-sectional
design. Results showed that (1) anxiety related to COVID-19 is associated with
conspiracy beliefs, anger at the government, and populist attitudes, and (2) support
for and compliance with hygiene measures are both positively predicted by anxiety
related to COVID-19; however, (3) support for hygiene measures is also predicted
by populist attitudes and negatively by conspiracy mentalities, whereas compliance
with hygiene measures is more strongly predicted by anger at transgressors (anger at
people transgressing the hygiene measures). Consequently, although anxiety related
to COVID-19 concerns the health of individual people, it also has political and social
implications: anxiety is associated with an increase in anger, either at transgressors or
the government.
Keywords: anger, anxiety, conspiracy mentality, populism, terror management theory (tmt), threat, COVID-19
pandemic, hygiene measures
COVID-19 THREAT
Previous studies on infection outbreaks and recent ones on the current COVID-19 pandemic have
shown that pathogens like the coronavirus not only pose medical health problems, but also elicit
a vast amount of anxiety and mental stress (Liu et al., 2020; Robillard et al., 2020; Kruglanski
et al., 2021). In line with current theorizing, we argue that anxiety is the central emotion in the
response of an individual to the pandemic and, thus, influences how people respond to the threat
of becoming contaminated (Van Bavel et al., 2020a,b).We prefer to use the term anxiety rather than
fear, although there are many similarities between the two concepts. Fear always has an identifiable
object, as one is afraid of something (e.g., Öhman and Rück, 2007), and is related to a specific coping
behavior, namely, avoidance (Öhman, 2009). However, when a situation is difficult to control due
to uncertainty about the exact nature of a threat, the term “anxiety” is more appropriate. Anxiety
refers to a more generalized negative state of mind of foreboding or apprehensive anticipation of
future danger, and is thus more applicable to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Anxietymay lead to different types of responses depending on the context, the type of threat, and
individual characteristics. For example, on the basis of brain research, researchers have identified
a fight, flight, or freeze response (Gray and McNaughton, 2000). In addition, emotion researchers
have also found that anxiety or fear does not only lead to the tendencies to run away or avoid
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threats but also to oppose or attack the threat (depending on the
perceived coping potential of the individual; Frijda, 1986; Smith
and Lazarus, 1990). Here, we identify two different and seemingly
opposite responses, namely, avoiding the threat (by complying
with hygiene rules) and fighting the threat (by showing anger at
the government or supporting populist attitudes or by conspiracy
mentalities). The question we examine is how these different
anxiety responses relate to each other, and whether populist
attitudes and conspiracymentalities may affect how an individual
supports or complies with hygiene rules.
Anxiety About COVID-19
Anxiety, more than other negative emotions such as anger or
sadness, is characterized by the appraisal of uncertainty: one
simply does not know what will happen in the (near) future;
this is the core characteristic of anxiety (Roseman, 1984; Smith
and Ellsworth, 1985). In addition, research on core relational
themes, which reflect a specific combination of various appraisal
dimensions, has shown that the core relational theme of fear
and anxiety is danger or threat. This implies that the situation
is appraised as motivationally relevant, incongruent with the
goals of an individual, and characterized by uncertainty and
a weak ability to adjust to the threat (Smith and Ellsworth,
1985). The latter two appraisals are especially uncharacteristic for
anger or sadness, in which case one knows what one is angry
or sad about. There are different ways to cope with emotions
(Smith and Lazarus, 1990), but a common element in negative
emotions is that people are generally motivated to downregulate
negative emotions (e.g., Larsen, 2000) or reduce uncertainty or
ambiguity as much as possible (e.g., van Harreveld et al., 2009).
Thus, the more anxious people are about becoming infected with
the coronavirus, the more they will be motivated to reduce the
resulting anxiety (Dixon-Gordon et al., 2015).
Since COVID-19 not only concerns our health but also our
social lives and personal wellbeing, it can be regarded as an
existential threat. At the time of our data collection, it was still
unknown how exactly the coronavirus spreads, how multiple
infections can take place, and whether potential vaccines might
help against its different variants. This global lack of scientific
knowledge and control over such an existential threat triggered
anxiety and uncertainty among people. To date, many studies,
for example, in China (Chen et al., 2020; Liu et al., 2020; Tian
et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2020; Zhu et al., 2020) and in EU
countries (Mazza et al., 2020; Ozamiz-Etxebarria et al., 2020; Pieh
et al., 2020; Robillard et al., 2020) have shown that people are
experiencing anxiety as a reaction to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Not everyone is equally anxious, however, as anxiety levels
have been shown to depend on how one estimates the risk of
becoming infected (Xu and Cheng, 2021). This might explain
why, in some studies, people with the highest probability of
becoming infected are the most anxious, such as the elderly
(Hyland et al., 2020), people whose friends or family have become
infected, or those who lived close to pandemic flashpoints. For
example, the population in the central provinces in China where
the COVID-19 pandemic broke out reported more distress than
anywhere else across China (Zhao et al., 2020). Therefore, anxiety
seems to vary with closeness to perceived sources of infection (see
e.g., Cao et al., 2020).
The Role of Anxiety in Responses to the
COVID-19 Threat
Depending on individual characteristics, the nature of the threat,
and the specific and broader cultural context in which the
threat occurs, fear or anxiety may elicit different types of
responses. When the perceived threat is acute (e.g., a fire),
our neurobehavioral system can respond with three types of
responses: fight, flight, or freeze (Gray and McNaughton, 2000).
This is in line with studies on experienced action tendencies,
which showed that anxious people reported tendencies to avoid,
run away from, or attack the threat (Smith and Ellsworth,
1985; Frijda et al., 1989). In the case of the current COVID-
19 threat, we distinguished two types of responses. The first
response has the goal of avoiding the threat and thus minimize
the risk of becoming contaminated, which is comparable to the
flight response. This can be effectuated by taking precautionary
measures, such as complying with hygiene measures. We expect
that, the more anxious people become, the more they will try
to avoid infection by the threatening coronavirus, implying that
anxiety should be a positive predictor of the support for and
compliance with hygiene measures as an individual will try to
protect themselves from becoming infected with the coronavirus
(see also Harper et al., 2020). People who show this avoidance
response are also likely to become angry at people who do not
comply with hygiene measures because these transgressors block
the goal of these individuals to keep themselves safe (Roseman,
2018).
Anxiety may also elicit a second response, namely, the fight or
“attack” response, which is indicative of anger. Although anxiety
and anger are characterized by opposite behavioral tendencies
(Carver and Harmon-Jones, 2009), both may result from a
negative emotional state (Berkowitz, 1993). Blaming others is
also a means of regaining a feeling of control or agency to
handle the pandemic situation (e.g., Harmon-Jones, 2003; Fischer
and Roseman, 2007). Various theories on intergroup threats
(e.g., Stephan and Stephan, 2000; Neuberg and Cottrell, 2002),
existential threats (Rosenblatt et al., 1989; Greenberg et al., 1997),
or personal threats (Hogg, 2012) have also suggested that anxiety
may elicit anger responses. The uncertainty that is characteristic
of such threats has broader implications, bringing about threats
to the self-esteem, life goals, or social relevance of an individual
and thus motivating the restoration of the sense of self and
significance in life of these individuals (Kruglanski et al., 2021).
One of the ways in which this restoration can take place is by
blaming others, who are seen as responsible for the negative
outcomes in the lives of these individuals (e.g., Greenberg et al.,
1997; van Prooijen, 2019).
Terror management theory (Greenberg et al., 1997) posits
that death-related anxiety reminds us of our own mortality
salience and the transience of our cultural heritage (Rosenblatt
et al., 1989). According to this theory, in order to defend
ourselves against such death-related anxiety, we fall back on the
cultural, religious, and political beliefs that have been part of our
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worldviews because such beliefs provide symbolic immortality
and transcend the biological reality. This worldview defense
hypothesis has been supported by various studies showing that,
when people are reminded of their own deaths, they intensify
their ideologies (Huddy et al., 2005; Huddy and Feldman, 2011),
implying that conservatives become more conservative and
liberals more liberal in these situations. However, more recent
studies suggest that, when reminded of their own death, people
show a shift to the right, with this observation being coined as
the conservative shift hypothesis (Jost and Napier, 2011; Kosloff
et al., 2016; Pyszczynski et al., 2021). Thus, people under threat
are more inclined to embrace conservative than liberal political
views and tend more to black-and-white thinking about their
social worlds. Both hypotheses are supported by a meta-analysis
(Kosloff et al., 2016), and the seemingly inconsistent results have
been explained by the different ways in which conservatism and
other concepts have been measured. Whatever the exact political
effects, both hypotheses support the idea that people under threat
fall back to simple, one-dimensional worldviews that are often
part of their own history. This is also characteristic of populism
and a conspiracy mentality.
Conspiracy Mentality and Populism
Existential threats also give rise to the making sense of the
related threatening events. Conspiracy theories (van Prooijen
and Acker, 2015) help to explain impactful events, such as a
pandemic, with simplistic, one-sided, and proportionally large
causes. These conspiracies are often the result of the deliberate
will of a clandestine and powerful group, such as cults, secret
organizations, or extraterrestrials (Leman and Cinnirella, 2007;
van Prooijen and Douglas, 2017; van Prooijen, 2019). People
differ in how susceptible they are to explanations based on
conspiracy theories, which is referred to as a conspiracymentality
(Bruder et al., 2013). A conspiracy mentality predicts beliefs in
specific conspiracy theories and has been shown to be related
with right-wing authoritarianism (Imhoff, 2015; Dyrendal et al.,
2021). Research on the relationship between stress, anxiety, and
conspiracy beliefs has shown inconsistent results, however. For
example, a recent study on the relation between self-reported
stress and COVID-19-related conspiracy theories did not provide
any significant relation, although it did show a relation with
a negative attitude toward the government (Georgiou et al.,
2020). In addition, another study showed that feeling a lack of
control, but not anxiety, was strongly correlated with conspiracy
endorsement (Cavojová et al., 2020). According to the Existential
Threat Model of Conspiracies (van Prooijen, 2019) that was
recently proposed by van Prooijen, conspiracy theories are
mainly endorsed when there are salient, antagonistic out-groups
who can be blamed for the existential threat. Such out-groups
can be low in power, such as minority groups; instances of
which we have seen examples during the current COVID-
19 pandemic. Especially early in the pandemic outbreak, anti-
Chinese sentiment (Sinophobia) increased as the Chinese were
accused of spreading the coronavirus (Gover et al., 2020).
Salient out-groups can also those be high in power, such as
governments, politicians, or CEOs (Douglas, 2021). Populism is
characterized by the society being divided into two homogeneous
and antagonistic groups (e.g., Mudde, 2004; Wirth et al., 2016;
Schulz et al., 2018; Wirz, 2018). This refers to the opposition
between “the pure people” and “the corrupt elites” (Manichean
dichotomy), which has been described as the essence of populism
(e.g., Mudde, 2004; Rodrik, 2020). This antagonistic thinking can
also be found in conspiracy theories where “actors join together
in secret agreement to try to achieve a hidden goal” (van Prooijen
and Acker, 2015). Indeed, previous research has also shown a
positive relationship between conspiracymentalities and populist
attitudes (Castanho Silva et al., 2017; Balta et al., 2021; Hameleers,
2021) or political extremism (van Prooijen and Acker, 2015).
Because the governments of most countries in the world
have taken measures to keep the COVID-19 pandemic at
bay, it seems obvious that they can become the target of the
anger of populists, as those with populist beliefs tend to blame
their governments for not taking the appropriate measures
or being too slow to prevent the spread of the coronavirus.
Anger toward the government has also been shown to be a
general feature of the populist mindset as a part of the populist
“us” vs. “them” (social categorization) rhetoric, particularly by
showing anger at the government, who are not “us” (see also
Abadi et al., 2020; Huguet-Cabot et al., 2021). Moreover, in
times of unpredictable changes (Brown, 2000; Hogg, 2001a,b;
Abrams and Hogg, 2010), derogating the out-group (in-group
favoritism vs. out-group derogation) is often an immediate result
of the perceived threat to the social identity of individuals.
Thus, anxiety about the coronavirus may strengthen populist
attitudes that, in turn, could in fact result in less support for
hygiene measures as they were set by the very same government
that has been accused of not properly handling the pandemic
(Rico et al., 2017; Salmela and von Scheve, 2017; Abadi et al.,
2020).
Applying these insights to the COVID-19 pandemic, we
assume that the coronavirus causes mortality salience. Anxious
individuals may show two different types of responses: avoiding
the threat by complying with hygiene measures or fighting
the threat, either by showing anger at the government and
adhering to populist mindsets or by denying or trivializing
the threat (conspiracy beliefs). There is indeed strong evidence
for the ability of anxiety to strengthen populist attitudes, as
indicated by the increase of in-group favoritism and out-
group hostility (Rosenblatt et al., 1989; Greenberg et al., 1990;
Schimel et al., 1999), but also conspiracy beliefs (e.g., Grzesiak-
Feldman, 2013; Swami et al., 2016; Hollander, 2018). In addition,
anxiety has been shown to predict behavioral changes with
regard to personal hygiene and social isolation (Harper et al.,
2020). The question of our current study is whether anxiety
related to COVID-19 indeed prompts these different responses
and whether these responses influence each other. In other
words, this study explored if conspiracy mentality and populist
attitudes also affect whether people support or comply with
hygiene measures.
Current Study
In the current study, we examined the different implications
of anxiety about the coronavirus in four different countries:
Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK. At the time of
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our data collection, the countries differed in amount of COVID-
19-related deaths and the measures being taken by the respective
governments, with Spain having the highest number of deaths,
followed by the UK. We, therefore, expected anxiety related to
COVID-19 to be the highest in Spain1. However, because the four
countries also have distinct public health laws, socio-economic
and political contexts, and implemented different measures at
different points in time during the COVID-19 pandemic2, it is
very difficult to compare the results across the countries. We will,
therefore, only include country as a variable when examining the
factors influencing anxiety. For the other hypotheses, we will use
the aggregated data of the four countries.
We tested the following four hypotheses. First (H1), Anxiety
about Coronavirus is predicted by factors that reflect the
proximity to sources of infection (age, country, and oneself or
friends becoming infected with the coronavirus). Second (H2),
Anxiety about Coronavirus is associated with Support for and
Compliance with Hygiene Measures, and Anger at Transgressors,
which all suggest a strategy to avoid the threat and keep
safe by trying to diminish the likelihood to become infected;
Anxiety about Coronavirus is also associated with Populist
Attitudes, Anger at Government, and Conspiracy Mentality. Third
(H3), Support for Hygiene Measures is positively predicted by
Anxiety about Coronavirus and Anger at Transgressors and
negatively by Conspiracy Mentality, Populist Attitudes, and Anger
at Government. Fourth (H4), we hypothesize that Compliance
with Hygiene Measures is mainly predicted by Anxiety about
Coronavirus and Anger at Transgressors but not by Populist
Attitudes, Anger at Government, or Conspiracy Mentality.
METHODS AND DESIGN
Sampling Procedure and Data Collection
We tested our hypotheses in a large-scale study across four
European countries. In view of the COVID-19 pandemic, we
included a variety of European countries with different public
health laws, socio-economic factors, and political cultures. Our
country samples included Germany, the Netherlands, Spain,
and the UK. Our desired representative sample size amounted
to approximately 500 respondents per country, while quotas
based on current UN-census data (United Nations Data Retrieval
System) were set up for age, gender, and geographical region.
In the informed consent, respondents were instructed about
the purpose of our study, their voluntary participation, and
guaranteed privacy based on the General Data Protection
1OnApril 13, 2020, Spain counted more than 17,000 deaths, while the Netherlands
and Germany reported less than 3,000 deaths. In the same week, there was a large
increase of coronavirus deaths in the UK, amounting to more than 11,000 deaths.
2When our survey was conducted in April 2020, Spanish citizens had already been
under full lockdown for 4 weeks (starting in March 14, 2020). On March 16, the
prime minister of the Netherlands addressed the nation to inform them about
social distancing measures that were less strict than in other European countries
(“intelligent lockdown”). On the same day, the state of Bavaria in Germany
declared a state of emergency, with other German states following soon after.
The measures taken in Germany varied per state, thus making it difficult to draw
general conclusions on the strictness of policy measures for the whole country. In
the UK, the measures became legally enforceable on March 26, and our British
sample had, therefore, already experienced the lockdown for over 2 weeks.
Regulation (GDPR). We obtained ethical approval from the
Faculty Ethics Review Board of the University of Amsterdam
(Number 2020-SP-12035).
Survey
The survey began with general information about our study and a
request for informed consent (see Appendix A). All respondents
were required to give informed consent before proceeding with
the actual questions. The survey included both existing and newly
developed scales3. Cronbach’s alpha (α) is the most common
measure of internal consistency (“reliability”) of survey items;
thus, it was used here to determine how reliable our multiple the
Likert-scale questions were.4
Measures
Anxiety about Coronavirus. We developed this scale to measure
anxiety related to the coronavirus infection, which included
three items, such as “I am concerned about the effects of the
Coronavirus” and “I am worried that my family may be affected
by the Coronavirus.” The three items (using a 10-point Likert-
scale from not at all to extremely) formed a reliable scale
(Cronbach’s α = 0.81).
Conspiracy Mentality. This scale included five items from the
existing scale Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (CMQ; Bruder
et al., 2013), such as “I think there are secret organizations
that greatly influence political decisions.” Considering the long
history of pandemics inciting anti-Semitism and its recent revival
(see Brackmann, 2020; Gerstenfeld, 2020; Kofta et al., 2020), we
decided to include the item “Jews or Zionists have engineered
the coronavirus as a biological weapon in order to dominate the
world”. The six items (using a 7-point Likert-scale from strongly
disagree to strongly agree) formed a reliable scale (Cronbach’s
α = 0.8).
Populist Attitudes. This scale was based on existing items
measuring Populist Attitudes (Akkerman et al., 2014; Schulz et al.,
2018), which was recently revised by Castanho Silva et al. (2020).
This scale consisted of three sub-scales, i.e., People-Centrism (e.g.,
“Politicians should always listen closely to the problems of the
people”), Anti-Elitism (e.g., “The government is pretty much
run by a few big interests looking out for themselves”), and
Manichaean Outlook (e.g., “You can tell if a person is good or bad
if you know their political views”). We also created a subscale for
Nativism by adding three items, such as “The political elites have
failed to protect our cultural identity.” The 10 items (using a 7-
point Likert-scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree) formed
a reliable scale (Cronbach’s α = 0.71).
Anger at Government. This scale was developed to measure
how respondents evaluated the recent actions of their
government concerning the COVID-19 pandemic. It included
four items based on previous research on anger by measuring
3In some cases, we used shortened versions of the original scale in order to prevent
our Qualtrics survey from becoming too long.
4Additional variables were measured but were not reported in the present study.
A complete list of measured variables and scales used in our Qualtrics survey
[e.g., symbolic and realistic threats, news consumption (headline selection), and
threat estimation (material and safety, coronavirus, prosocial behavior, and moral
reasoning)] can be found in Appendix A.
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the main anger appraisals (using a 7-point Likert-scale from
strongly disagree to strongly agree), for example, “I think that
our government can be blamed for not reacting fast enough to
the outbreak of the coronavirus,” which formed a reliable scale
(Cronbach’s α = 0.81).
Anger at Transgressors. We developed this scale to measure
how angry respondents were when other people transgressed the
hygiene measures set by the government during the COVID-19
pandemic. It included seven items (using a 7-point Likert-scale
from strongly disagree to strongly agree), such as “I think that the
main problem is that some people do not follow the rules,” or “I
would confront people who transgress the rules,” which formed a
reliable scale (Cronbach’s α = 0.7).
Support for Hygiene Measures. This scale was created to
evaluate the level of approval with various hygiene measures
imposed during the pandemic. The scale included nine items
(using a 7-point Likert-scale from strongly disagree to strongly
agree), such as “Hand washing for 20 seconds more than 5 times
a day” and “Wearing a face mask when leaving your house,” and
they formed a very reliable scale (Cronbach’s α = 0.88).
Compliance with Hygiene Measures. This scale included
the same nine items as Support for Hygiene Measures, with
respondents being asked to what extent (using a 7-point
Likert-scale from never to always) they comply with these
hygiene measures themselves. The items formed a reliable scale
(Cronbach’s α = 0.78).
Infection of Self or Friends. We asked whether respondents
themselves were infected with the Coronavirus (1 = I do not
know, 2 = No, 3 = Yes, but not confirmed yet, and 4 = Yes,
confirmed) and whether this was the case for their friends or
people in their immediate social environment (same categories).
Demographic Variables and Socio-Economic Status. We used
self-reported data on age, employment status [1 = unemployed,
2 = student, 3 = retired, 4 = (self) employed], gender,
marital status (1 = single, 2 = in a relationship, 3 = married,
4 = divorced, 5 = widowed), religiousness (1 = not at all,
10= extremely), spirituality (1= not at all, 10= extremely), and
(perceived) subjective socio-economic status [MacArthur Scale of
Subjective Social Status; Adler et al. (2000); 1 = low, 10 = high].
All survey items can be found in Appendix A.
Procedure
The survey was first developed in English and then translated
into three other languages by the native speakers of our
consortium partners before being back-translated into English.
In addition, each survey version was individualized based on
country specifications, such as country name and culture-specific
terms. All translated surveys were uploaded on the Qualtrics
online survey platform (Version: April 2020) and the survey data
were collected after being synchronized with a global research
platform (Cint) from April 12 to 14, 2020, which provided
us a heterogeneous pool of survey respondents across all four
countries involved in this study.
A pre-test with 50 respondents per country was run to evaluate
the survey time taken (on average between 15 and 20min). It
also aimed to assess the clarity of survey items and its suitability
to respondents across various countries. Our pre-test results
were satisfactory and no further survey revisions were required.
In total, our survey resulted in 2,062 respondents, while 31
respondents withmissing values were excluded, resulting in 2,031
complete respondents across four European countries.
RESULTS
Respondents
Our final sample consisted of 2,031 participants. Only
participants who passed the attention check were included in this
sample. The characteristics of our sample across four countries
included quotas based on current UN-census data, set up for age,
gender and geographical region (see Appendix B, Table B1).
Preliminary Analyses
We first checked all the reliabilities of ourmain scales per country
in order to detect issues with specific items. All scales had
Cronbach’s alphas (α) similar to the overall reliability and were
always higher than 0.6.
Determinants of Coronavirus Anxiety
Our first hypothesis was that anxiety about COVID-19 is
positively predicted by factors that reflect proximity to the
sources of infection. We tested this hypothesis by conducting
a hierarchical linear regression to examine whether proximity
to sources of infection (age, country, and oneself or friends
becoming infected) would increase anxiety related to COVID-19
(Anxiety about Coronavirus). We controlled for demographic
variables, namely, marital status, gender, employment status,
education, (perceived) subjective socio-economic status
(MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status; Adler et al., 2000),
and religiousness. We added religiousness because we assumed
that this may be a more general protection against feeling
anxious. We first dummy coded our categorical variables:
experience with getting infected or the infection of friends
(0 = no, 1 = yes), marital status (0 = no relation, 1 = in
relation), employment (0 = unemployed, 1 = employed) and
country. We used Spain as the reference category because
it had the highest number of COVID-19-related deaths
and the strictest governmental hygiene measures at the
moment we collected the data. We entered the variables
in two blocks: demographic (control) variables in the first
step, and age, infection (self and friends), and country in the
second step.
Table 1 shows the results of the hierarchical regression
analysis. The first model was significant [F(5,2025) = 27.619, p <
0.0001], showing that gender, marital status, and religiousness
contributed to the regression model and implying that women,
people in a relationship, and religious people were reported to
be more anxious (see also Robillard et al., 2020). The second
model, through the addition of factors related to proximity to
infection sources, explained another 9% of additional variance
[F(11,2030) = 33.186, p < 0.0001], showing that age, country,
and infection of friends further added to the explained variance.
The country variables showed that, compared to Spain, which
served as the reference group, participants from the three
other countries reported significantly lower amounts of Anxiety
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TABLE 1 | Hierarchical regression analysis in two steps for “anxiety about coronavirus” (standardized regression coefficients).
B t sr2 R R2 1R2
Model 1 33.793*** 0.253 0.062 0.064
Gender 0.107 4.898*** 0.105
Employment −0.028 −1.228 −0.026
Marital Status 0.108 4.826*** 0.104
Subjective Social Status −0.001 −0.042 −0.001
Religiousness 0.194 8.922*** 0.192
Model 2 28.790*** 0.391 0.153 0.089
Gender 0.107 5.137*** 0.105
Employment −0.01 −0.476 −0.010
Marital Status 0.068 3.128*** 0.064
Subjective Social Status 0.046 2.019* 0.041
Religiousness 0.179 8.504*** 0.174
Age 0.051 2.440* 0.050
Infection (Self) 0.010 0.485 0.010
Infection (Friends) 0.088 4.055*** 0.083
Germany −0.289 −11.055*** −0.226
UK −0.104 −4.059*** −0.083
The Netherlands −0.282 −10.943*** −0.240
N = 2,031. *p = 0.05, ***p < 0.001.
about Coronavirus. Furthermore, the elderly and people whose
friends or family had become infected were reported to
be more anxious. The individual themselves getting infected
did not appear to play a role in the reported anxiety of
the respondents.
These results confirmed the general hypothesis that more
exposure to COVID-19 (living in a country with higher
infection rates, age, and infection of friends and family)
is a positive predictor of anxiety. Some of our control
variables also showed some variance in explaining anxiety,
which may be interpreted by the fact that women generally
tend to report more intense emotions (e.g., Fischer et al.,
2004) and people in a relationship may be more concerned
about the lives of their loved ones in their immediate social
environment. In contrast with our assumption, religiousness
did not serve as buffer against the anxiety of individuals, but
rather the opposite. People who were religious were more,
rather than less, anxious. We further explored whether the
positive role of religiousness could be related to different
types of religions by checking how religious people reported
themselves to be (see Table 2). Clearly, Greek, and Russian
Orthodox Christians and Muslims rated themselves highest
on religiousness, whereas atheists, agnostics, and non-religious
individuals scored the lowest5.
In order to test the second hypothesis, we calculated the
Pearson correlations between the following variables: Anxiety
about Coronavirus, Support for and Compliance with Hygiene
Measures, Anger at Transgressors, Populist Attitudes, Anger at
5We also checked whether the correlation differed across the countries, however
this was not the case: in all four countries the correlation was between 0.17 and
0.24. Moreover, feelings of religiousness were not different per country either
(F(3,2030) = 1.605, p= 0.186).
TABLE 2 | Means and SD of “religiousness,” split for people with various religions.
Religion M SD N
Greek-Orthodox 7.70 2.627 10
Muslim 6.98 2.080 87
Russian-Orthodox 6.18 2.786 11
Jewish 5.82 2.481 22
Roman Catholic 5.35 2.419 566
Protestant 5.20 2.554 293
Hindu 5.00 2.530 11
Buddhist 5.07 2.890 15
Spiritual 4.83 3.073 75
Agnostic 2.60 2.078 55
Non-Religious 2.31 2.026 731
Atheist 1.83 1.840 155
Total 3.96 2.805 2,031
Government, and Conspiracy Mentality. As shown in Table 3, all
correlations are positive and moderately strong. The strongest
correlations were found between Populist Attitudes, Conspiracy
Mentality, and Anger at Government.
In order to test the third hypothesis, namely, that Support
for Hygiene Measures is positively predicted by Anxiety
about Coronavirus and Anger at Transgressors but negatively
by Conspiracy Mentality, Populist Attitudes, and Anger at
Government, we conducted a hierarchical linear regression with
Support for Hygiene Measures as the dependent variable. We
entered Anxiety about Coronavirus in the first step, Populist
Attitudes, Anger at Government, Conspiracy Mentality, and Anger
at Transgressors in the second step, and country in the third step
(see Table 4).
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TABLE 3 | Pearson correlations between scales.















Anxiety about coronavirus 6.86 (1.96)
Support for hygiene measures 5.79 (1.02) 0.390**
Compliance with hygiene measures 4.67 (1.21) 0.305** 0.327**
Conspiracy mentality 4.34 (1.10) 0.190** 0.103** 0.258**
Populist attitudes 4.70 (1.43) 0.240** 0.306** 0.202** 0.615**
Anger at government 4.16 (1.43) 0.249** 0.138** 0.243** 0.497** 0.436**
Anger at transgressors 4.25 (1.02) 0.329** 0.386** 0.201** 0.214** 0.328** 0.201**
**p < 0.001.
The hierarchical regression in Table 4 shows that the first
model is significant [F(1,2029) = 363.646, p < 0.0001]. The
second model, through the addition of various types of attitudes
and political beliefs, explains an additional 11% of additional
variance [F(5,2025) = 146.703, p < 0.0001], implying that Populist
Attitudes, Anger at Transgressors, and Conspiracy Mentality, but
not Anger at Government, are significant predictors. As expected,
more Anger at Transgressors predicted more Support for Hygiene
Measures, whereas stronger beliefs in Conspiracy Mentality
predicted less Support for Hygiene Measures. Unexpectedly,
Anger at Government was not significant, whereas Populist
Attitudes was a positive predictor of Support for Hygiene
Measures, implying that people who think in terms of “us’ vs.
“them” are more likely to approve of hygiene measures.
In order to test our fourth hypothesis, which stated that
Compliance with Hygiene Measures is mainly predicted by
Anxiety about Coronavirus and Anger at Transgressors but not by
Populist Attitudes,Anger at Government, orConspiracyMentality,
we conducted a similar regression analysis, but with Compliance
with Hygiene Measures as the dependent variable. Table 5 shows
that the first model is significant [F(1,2029) = 208.098, p< 0.0001],
indicating that Anxiety about Coronavirus significantly explains
the variance in Compliance with Hygiene Measures. The second
model, through the addition of political beliefs, explained another
5% of additional variance [F(5,2025) = 87.126, p < 0.0001],
showing that Anger at Government, Anger at Transgressors, and
Conspiracy Mentality also added to the explained variance. As
expected, Anxiety about Coronavirus and Anger at Transgressors
were positive predictors and Populist Attitudes was not; however,
Anger at Government and Conspiracy Mentality were also both
positive predictors of Compliance with Hygiene Measures.
DISCUSSION
We reported the results of an online survey conducted in
four European countries in April 2020 only a few weeks after
the COVID-19 pandemic had erupted, examining the reported
anxiety of individuals in relation to becoming infected with
the coronavirus and how this affects their support for and
compliance with hygiene measures and anger at the government
and conspiracy mentality. Our results, first of all, showed
that anxiety about the coronavirus is mostly predicted by
factors that reflect proximity to the sources of infection. The
elderly, individuals who reported infections in their immediate
social environment, and those who lived in countries with
high infection rates (Spain) reported the most anxiety. Other
demographic variables also played a role. Women and people
in intimate relationships reported stronger anxiety than men
and people who were single. The fact that women rather than
men reported more anxiety may contradict the general idea
that the likelihood of becoming a victim would make someone
more anxious since hospitalization and death rates among
older men is especially higher than among women. However,
studies have found that women generally tend to report stronger
emotions (Fischer, 2000; Fischer et al., 2004), which is an
observation that has been found in other studies on mental
stress about infection as well (e.g., Capraro and Barcelo, 2020;
Liu et al., 2020). Thus, the subjective appraisal of the threat
apparently outweighs the actual likelihood of becoming infected.
The finding that people in intimate relationships show more
anxiety can be explained by the fact that people generally seem
more concerned about the health of their friends and family
rather than their own, which is reflected in the finding that
anxiety about the infections of others is a stronger predictor
for anxiety about the coronavirus than anxiety about becoming
infected oneself.
Regarding our main hypotheses, we first found support
for the idea that the anxiety of an individual about the
coronavirus is positively associated with support for and
compliance with hygiene measures and anger at people who
transgress the hygiene measures, suggesting that people are
foremost trying to avoid becoming infected. However, this
did not seem to be the only response, as anxiety is also
associated with attacking the threat via beliefs that are not
health-related: populist attitudes, anger at the government,
and adherence to conspiracy theories. In other words, people
under threat may fall back to simple, one-dimensional,
and extreme worldviews, such as conspiracy theories (see
Grzesiak-Feldman, 2013; Swami et al., 2016; Hollander,
2018) or accusations that the actions of the government
or the elites are too little, too late to stop the spread of
the coronavirus.
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TABLE 4 | Hierarchical regression analysis for “support for hygiene measures” in three steps (standardized regression coefficients).
β t sr2 R R2 1R2
Model 1 58.037*** 0.390 0.152 0.152
Anxiety about coronavirus 0.310 19.070*** 0.390
Model 2 23.882*** 0.516 0.266 0.114
Anxiety about coronavirus 0.281 13.602*** 0.259
Populist attitudes 0.262 10.332*** 0.197
Anger at government −0.019 −0.829 −0.016
Anger at transgressors 0.245 11.696*** 0.223
Conspiracy mentality −0.155 −6.094*** −0.116
N = 2031. ***p < 0.001.
TABLE 5 | Hierarchical regression analysis for “compliance with hygiene measures” in three steps (standardized regression coefficients).
β t sr2 R R2 1R2
Model 1 36.310*** 0.328 107 0.107
Anxiety about coronavirus 0.305 14.426*** 0.305
Model 2 14.729*** 0.396 0.157 0.050
Anxiety about coronavirus 0.229 10.296*** 0.211
Populist attitudes −0.021 −0.760 −0.016
Anger at government 0.100 4.081*** 0.077
Anger at transgressors 0.078 3.448** 0.084
Conspiracy mentality 0.161 5.861*** 0.120
N = 2,031. **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Therefore, the more anxious people are, the angrier they
may become, regardless if this anger may be directed at their
government or at other people. Anger provides a feeling of
control where an individual can at least can blame others, which
is a state of mind that may be preferred over uncertainty: not
knowing what will happen next. Indeed, previous research has
shown that people try to feel the emotions that they prefer and
seemmost useful in specific contexts (e.g., Tamir and Ford, 2012).
Other evidence may be found in research on shame and guilt
proneness, showing that the tendency to feel ashamed or guilty
is related to the tendency to become angry and blame others for
negative events (e.g., Tangney et al., 1992). More generally, it has
been found that individuals in negative physical or emotional
(stressed) states are more likely to become angry and behave
aggressively (Berkowitz, 1993). Thus, our finding that anxious
people are also more likely to report anger may be the result
of a general state of negative arousal due to the COVID-19
crisis. Because of the correlational nature of the data, however,
we cannot draw any firm conclusion about the causal effects of
anxiety on anger.
Whereas anxiety and anger signal different, even opposite
motivational tendencies, namely, avoiding vs. attacking
(blaming), there is also evidence suggesting that these emotions
can co-occur. For example, it has been argued that people can
experience mixed emotions, especially in response to big or
ambiguous events (e.g., Ross, 2013; Solomon, 2013; Larsen
and McGraw, 2014; Van Rythoven, 2015). Most research on
mixed emotions shows that people can feel sad and happy at the
same time and in response to the same event; the experience of
different negative emotions is even more likely (e.g., Ross, 2013).
Our third hypothesis was that support for hygiene measures
enforced by the government is not only predicted by anxiety
about the coronavirus, but also negatively by conspiracy
mentality, populist attitudes, and anger at the government. As
expected, we found that anxiety and anger at transgressors
predicted support for hygienemeasures. In addition, a conspiracy
mentality was a negative predictor, while populist attitudes were a
significant positive predictor. Although other studies conducted
in the US (e.g., Gollwitzer et al., 2020) suggest that people
who supported the Trump administration were less anxious
and less supportive of hygiene measures, our data showed a
different pattern. In our study, anger at the government was
a non-significant predictor, which may be explained by the
fact that all governments in our four countries took drastic
action, and not least because participants would support hygiene
measures independently of the steps their governments took. As
expected, support for hygiene measures was negatively predicted
by conspiracy mentality, because the beliefs of an individual
in clandestine forces and their covert actions in explaining the
COVID-19 threat wouldmake the hygienemeasures superfluous.
Populist attitudes, however, were a positive predictor of support
for hygiene measures, which we explained by the fact that
anxious people are more prone to populist thinking, which would
contribute to their approval of the hygiene measures.
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We also found that anxiety, anger at transgressors and
the government, and conspiracy mentalities predicted whether
individuals themselves complied with the hygiene measures
(fourth hypothesis). As expected, the additional explained
variance by including populist attitudes, anger at the government,
and conspiracy mentalities was less than in the case of support
for hygiene measures. Here, anger at the government was a
significant positive predictor that may suggest that individuals
perceived the measures that were taken as insufficient, and thus
made sure to abide by the rules by themselves. This may also
explain the positive relation with conspiracymentality. Assuming
that the pandemic would be a global conspiracy, one would not
approve of any action that restricts the freedom of people, but
the salience of illness or death may have increased the anxiety of
an individual and overruled their general critical judgment of the
government. This is in line with the fact that compliance with
hygiene measures was also more heavily predicted by country
than support for hygiene measures, presumably because of the
variety of pandemic-related restrictions across the four countries.
The differences in significant predictors for approving of and
behaving according to the governmental hygiene measures is
interesting. The agreement of an individual with certainmeasures
seems more strongly related to their views on the government
and belief in conspiracies, whereas following actual measures to
prevent contracting an infection seems more strongly related to
the anxiety of the individual about becoming infected and their
exposure to the coronavirus. This may also explain why country
was a stronger positive predictor of compliance than support
for hygiene measures. As Spain had the highest death rate and
largest number of infections, this context may explain why people
supported and complied with measures that would slow down
the coronavirus transmission. It may also explain why Spain was
consistently different from Germany, the Netherlands, and the
UK, especially with regard to compliance with hygiene measures
and individual anxiety. On the basis of our present research
design and measures, however, we cannot fully address whether
other country variables, such as political situation or socio-
cultural orientation, may have played a role, so more research is
needed to further examine these factors.
LIMITATIONS
One potential limitation of an online survey is the
representativeness and quality of the sample. We used quotas
based on UN-census data for age, gender, and geographical
region. In addition, our demographic data also showed
variability in employment status and education level, so we
obtained a relatively representative sample. In addition, we
added an attention check question, and none of the participants
failed this question, indicating that the participants were focused
and reliable. Second, we used self-reports, measuring the
beliefs, feelings, and behaviors of the respondents. Whereas
using self-reports for measuring beliefs and feelings is very
common in psychological research, measuring behavior through
self-reports may be less accurate and more prone to social
desirability effects than, for example, observing behavior.
Yet, we were not aware of better methods to collect this type
of information during the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown,
when people were requested to stay mostly at home. A third
limitation concerns the translation of our survey items into
four different languages. Words have culture-specific meanings
sometimes, and thus were understood slightly differently across
the four countries. Our back-translation procedure did not
reveal any major issues, however. In addition, we consistently
used multiple items to measure each construct; hence, we
think that this issue was reduced as much as possible. We
also checked the reliabilities of our scales separately for each
country, and they were all satisfactory, except for compliance
with hygiene measures, the lack of which we explained in the
results section.
CONCLUSION
Our study shows that anxiety about the coronavirus is not
only associated with the motive to avoid the COVID-19 threat
by following hygiene measures, but can also lead to anger-
related responses, as reflected in populist attitudes, anger at the
government, and conspiracy mentalities. In addition to anxiety,
these beliefs significantly influence whether one approves and,
to a lesser extent, behaves according to governmental hygiene
measures to contain the coronavirus. Both support for and
compliance with hygiene measures is primarily predicted by the
anxiety of individuals and anger at transgressors, but also by
the anger individuals have about the threat, suggesting support
for the idea that the COVID-19 pandemic causes mortality
salience. Thus, anxious people may also become angry and
more likely to oppose their government, even though, ultimately,
they seem to prefer their own survival over emotionally
laden conflicts.
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